Tag: Agents
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Governance Decay: How Compaction Deletes Agent Safety Rules
A June 2026 benchmark shows context compaction doesn’t fade an agent’s safety rules, it deletes them outright, and attackers can force the drop.
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MITRE ATLAS: The ATT&CK Framework for AI Systems
MITRE ATLAS provides the shared vocabulary for AI security threat intelligence: 14 tactic categories, techniques like AML.T0018 (Backdoor ML Model) and AML.T0043 (Craft Adversarial Data), and a crosswalk…
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Multiagent LLM Security: When Your Agent Talks to a Malicious Agent
When LLMs call other LLMs as tools, injection attacks jump the boundary. ConVerse (2026) found 88% privacy violations and 60% security breaches in plausible agent-to-agent discourse. Here is…
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LLMail-Inject: What 208K Attacks Against an Email Agent Found
Microsoft Research’s LLMail-Inject challenge: 839 participants, 208,095 unique attacks against a simulated email agent with production defenses. The finding: adaptive attackers breach even well-designed defense stacks. Here is…
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Red-Teaming LLM Applications: A Practitioner’s Framework
LLM red-teaming spans three distinct surfaces: model layer (jailbreaking), application layer (injection), and supply chain. Different attacks, different defenses, different responsible parties. Here is the methodology that covers…
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LLM Supply Chain Attacks: PoisonGPT to Poisoned Skills
PoisonGPT used $1 of compute to pass benchmarks with modified facts. The April 2026 PoisonedSkills paper tested the same supply chain logic against Claude Code and Gemini CLI.…
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Jailbreaking vs Prompt Injection: Two Different LLM Problems
Jailbreaking targets model content policy. Prompt injection targets application architecture. The defenses don’t overlap, the responsible parties differ, and the same RLHF training that resists jailbreaks amplifies injection…
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MCP Server Security: Prompt Injection and Tool Poisoning
MCPoison and CurXecute (CVE-2025-54136 and 54135) exploited the same MCP architectural gap: tool description fields loaded at agent boot with no sanitization. Here is the tools/list mechanism, the…
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LLM Excessive Agency: Why Every Tool Your Agent Has Is a Risk
Every tool an LLM agent has is an attack surface. OWASP’s LLM06 and the b3 benchmark across 31 models show why: capability scope determines blast radius. Here is…
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OWASP LLM Top 10 for 2025: The Mechanism Behind Each Vulnerability
The OWASP LLM Top 10 for 2025 added System Prompt Leakage and Vector Weaknesses, reworked Excessive Agency, and moved Sensitive Disclosure to second place. Here is the architectural…
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Indirect Prompt Injection: The Attack That Hides in Your Data
Indirect prompt injection lets attackers hijack LLMs by hiding instructions in documents, web pages, and tool results the model processes. Here is why the architecture makes this unavoidable…
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